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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
No one likes bad cell phone reception or slow 
streaming data on their smartphone, but that does not mean 
anyone wants a cellular antenna in their neighborhood, which 
is why there are zoning battles like the one central to this 
case.   
 
T Mobile Northeast LLC (“T Mobile”), a wireless 
telecommunications service provider, applied to the Zoning 
Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”) of the City of Wilmington, 
Delaware for permission to erect an antenna in the City.  The 
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ZBA said no.  So, relying on a provision of federal law that 
allows a disappointed wireless service provider like T Mobile 
to seek review in a district court “within 30 days after” a 
zoning authority’s “final action,” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v), T Mobile filed suit.  After the case had 
proceeded for over a year, however, the District Court 
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.  The Court reasoned that 
because T Mobile filed its complaint before the ZBA released 
a written decision confirming an earlier oral rejection of the 
zoning application, the claim was not ripe.  And, since 
T Mobile did not supplement its complaint to include the 
ZBA’s written decision within 30 days of its issuance, the 
Court also concluded that relation back could not remedy the 
ripeness defect.  The District Court thus granted the City’s 
motion for summary judgment.   
 
T Mobile now appeals.  It argues that its complaint 
was not premature or, in the alternative, that its supplemental 
pleading cured any ripeness problem.  We agree that the grant 
of summary judgment was improper and, for the reasons that 
follow, will remand the case for further proceedings 




A. Statutory Framework 
 
This dispute is governed by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 (“TCA”), which amended the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934 and includes provisions on 
mobile phone services.  Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 1, 704, 110 
Stat. 56, 56, 151 (1996); 47 U.S.C. § 332.  Passed to 
“encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications 
4 
 
technologies,” Preamble, 110 Stat. at 56, the TCA provides 
for expedited review in federal court of a denial of permission 
to build a cell phone antenna, id. § 704, 110 Stat. at 151-52.  
Such review is a “benefit Congress expressly intended to 
confer on wireless providers[.]”  Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity 
Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).  At the same time, 
the TCA also serves to preserve local zoning authority.  47 
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).   
 
At issue here are three key sections of the statute.  
First, the TCA mandates that “[a] State or local government 
or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for 
authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless 
service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the 
request is duly filed[.]”  Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).  The Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has interpreted 
“reasonable period of time” in that statutory provision to 
mean that zoning authorities have a “shot clock”1 and must 
act within 90 days of an application to attach an antenna to an 
existing structure or 150 days of an application where a new 
support structure is to be built.  Petition for Declaratory 
                                                 
1  “Shot clock” is a term borrowed from basketball.  In 
that game, it signifies a time limit to make a shot attempt, 
beginning once a team has possession of the basketball.  See, 
e.g., Nat’s Basketball Ass’n, NBA Rulebook Rule No. 7: Shot 
Clock (2018-2019), http://official.nba.com/rule-no-7-24-
second-clock/.  If the team has not made a shot attempt, i.e., 
acted, within the prescribed time limit, it forfeits possession 
of the ball.  Id.  Here, the permitting authority has exclusive 
jurisdiction over an application until it fails to act within a 
“reasonable period of time.”  47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(A), 
332(c)(7)(B)(ii).   
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Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(B), 24 FCC 
Rcd. 13994, 14008, 14012 (2009).  Second, in what we will 
call the “review provision” of the statute, the TCA grants 
“[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure 
to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality 
thereof” a right to have that locality’s decision reviewed by 
“commenc[ing] an action” “within 30 days” in district court.  
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  Third, in the statute’s “denial 
provision,” the TCA states that “[a]ny decision by a State or 
local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request 
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service 
facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial 
evidence contained in a written record.”  Id. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).  Notably, the terms “act,” “final action,” 
and “decision … to deny” are not defined in the TCA.  
Furthermore, the statute does not make clear whether “final 
action” should be read to encompass all decisions to deny, 
including oral ones, nor does it address whether there is a 
difference between an “act” for purposes of the shot clock 
and a “final action” for purposes of judicial review. 
 
B. Factual Background 
 
T Mobile is a telecommunications service provider.  It 
says that it needs to erect a cellular antenna to fill “a 
significant gap” in coverage for its customers in Wilmington, 
Delaware, (Opening Br. at 3) presumably where there has 
been an increase in phone calls and data usage.  T Mobile 
wants to put its antenna on top of a senior living high-rise in 
the City, but, because a special exception to local zoning laws 
is needed, it first had to go to the ZBA.  It filed an initial 
application and then, on August 25, 2016, a final amended 




The ZBA held a hearing on October 26, 2016, to 
consider T Mobile’s request, some two months after the final 
amended application was submitted.  During the hearing, 
T Mobile presented evidence of the need for the antenna and 
discussed proposals to address aesthetic concerns.  The ZBA 
also received objections from members of the local 
community, some of whom were outspoken in worrying 
about the effects of radio frequency emissions.  At the end of 
the hearing, the ZBA denied T Mobile’s application in a 
unanimous oral decision.   
 
The Board gave several reasons for the denial.  One 
board member said the ZBA should not encourage the use of 
a senior living community rooftop as the base for an antenna 
because of the potential adverse effect on the properties in the 
neighborhood.  Another board member said there was not 
enough proof of a need for additional coverage to support the 
application.  The Chairman said there was not enough 
evidence that T Mobile needed the antenna and that it did not 
appear to satisfy the zoning code in terms of placement and 
height restrictions.   
 
The ZBA’s oral decision to deny the application was 
not put in writing on October 26 or anytime soon thereafter.  
According to T Mobile, that fits a “pattern and practice of 
[the ZBA] not issuing a written decision of land use denials 
unless or until the City is sued.”  (Opening Br. at 7.)  Only 
after T Mobile had filed its initial complaint in the District 
Court, and after the City filed its answer, did the ZBA issue 
its written decision and explanation of its reasoning for 




T Mobile asserts that the denial of its application 
violates the TCA.  Under the statute, such a denial is invalid 
if it has the “effect of prohibiting the provision of personal 
wireless services[,]” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), or is “on 
the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency 
emissions[,]” id. at § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).  T Mobile claims that 
Wilmington’s denial was improper on both of those grounds.2  
But those assertions go to the merits and are not actually 
before us on this appeal.  At issue now is whether T Mobile’s 
claim can be heard at all. 
 
C. Procedural History 
  
 Evidently with its eye on the 30-day deadline in the 
TCA’s review provision, T Mobile filed a lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
within 30 days of the ZBA’s oral decision, challenging that 
denial.3  In addition to its claims on the merits, T Mobile’s 
initial complaint alleged that the City violated procedures 
mandated in the TCA, specifically those in the denial 
provision, by failing to provide a written decision 
                                                 
2  T Mobile also raised a Delaware state law claim.  
That claim is not at issue here and does not impact 
T Mobile’s claims under federal law. 
3  For reasons discussed herein, the 30-day filing 
deadline was not triggered by the oral decision.  See infra pp. 
12-20.  If it were, however, T Mobile’s complaint would have 
been timely.  The oral decision was delivered at the 
October 26, 2016 hearing.  Suit was filed on November 28, 
2016, but because the thirtieth day from October 26 fell on a 
weekend, the November 28 filing was within the 30-day 
window.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1).   
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contemporaneous with its oral decision and by not supporting 
the denial with substantial evidence.   
 
The parties entered into a stipulation asking the 
District Court for an expedited case schedule, as provided for 
in the review provision of the TCA.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  That request was granted.  Wilmington 
then answered the complaint, asserting a number of 
affirmative defenses, including that the complaint was not 
ripe because the ZBA had not yet issued a final written 
decision.  Nevertheless, the City did not, at that time, file a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Two days after the City filed its answer, the 
ZBA issued a written decision on T Mobile’s application.  
The parties pressed forward with the suit and prepared a 
discovery plan, which specifically mentioned the written 
decision.  T Mobile filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which the City met with a cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  The City’s motion was styled in the alternative as 
a motion to dismiss the complaint as unripe because it was 
filed prematurely, i.e., before the written decision had been 
issued.   
 
Not until December 21, 2017, nearly a year after the 
ZBA issued its written denial, did T Mobile file a motion 
seeking leave to amend or supplement the initial complaint to 
note the issuance of that written decision.4  The District Court 
                                                 
4  When “[a] claim or defense set out in a pleading [is] 
affected by events that occur after the pleading is filed …. 
Rule 15(d) allows a court,” to permit a supplemental 
pleading.  3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 
Practice ¶ 15.30 (3d ed. 2018).  Supplemental pleadings 
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granted the motion to supplement.  Wilmington then 
responded by moving to dismiss the supplemental complaint 
as untimely because it failed to cure the defect.     
 
Ultimately, the District Court granted Wilmington’s 
cross-motion for summary judgment for want of jurisdiction, 
without ruling on the City’s motion to dismiss.  The Court 
first concluded that the initial complaint was irreparably 
unripe because both the TCA and Delaware law require the 
ZBA to issue a written decision before the agency’s action 
could be considered final, and T Mobile had thus filed its 
initial complaint too soon.  Second, the Court said that the 
supplemental complaint could not fix the ripeness problem 
because it was filed past the 30-day window for seeking 
review of the ZBA’s final action.  Because the Court reached 
                                                                                                             
 
under Rule 15(d) differ from amended pleadings made under 
Rule 15(a).  First, amended pleadings “relate to matters that 
occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading and 
entirely replace the earlier pleading; [supplemental pleadings] 
deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and 
represent additions to or continuations of the earlier 
pleadings.”  6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 1504 (3d ed. 2018).  Second “certain 
amendments may be made as a matter of course within stated 
time periods, whereas all supplemental pleadings require 
leave of court under Rule 15(d).”  Id.  “Parties and courts 
occasionally confuse supplemental pleadings with amended 
pleadings and mislabeling is common.”  Id.  Here, T Mobile’s 
complaint was filed as an amended complaint but it is 
properly categorized as a supplemental complaint, and we 
will refer to it as such herein.   
10 
 
that determination, it found it unnecessary to conclude 
whether T Mobile’s supplemental complaint was entitled to 
the benefit of the relation-back doctrine under Rule 15(c).   
 
This appeal followed.   
II. DISCUSSION5 
 
T Mobile challenges the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Wilmington, contending that 
there is jurisdiction to hear its case.  It advances two 
alternative grounds for reversal: that its complaint was ripe 
because the ZBA’s oral decision qualifies as a “final action” 
under the review provision of the TCA, and, in the 
alternative, that the supplemental complaint relates back to 
and cures any ripeness problem with its initial complaint.  
Those arguments in turn raise three questions for determining 
whether the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling was proper.  
First, whether the oral decision of the ZBA was a final action.  
Second, whether the timing requirement in the TCA’s review 
provision is jurisdictional.  And third, whether an untimely 
                                                 
5  The District Court had jurisdiction to consider its 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), but 
determined the complaint contained incurable jurisdictional 
defects and declined to reach the merits.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review all the issues 
presented in this case de novo, as they involve only legal 
issues, i.e., interpretation of a federal statute and of a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure.  Giles v. Campbell, 698 F.3d 153, 
155 (3d Cir. 2012); Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 
407, 413 (3d Cir. 2011); DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas, 508 F.3d 




supplemental complaint can relate back and cure an unripe 
initial complaint.  Although we disagree with T Mobile that 
an oral decision of the ZBA qualifies as a “final action,” we 
agree that jurisdiction was proper in the District Court 
because the timing requirement in the TCA’s review 
provision is non-jurisdictional, and T Mobile’s supplemental 
complaint therefore relates back and cures the ripeness 
problem with the initial complaint.  The District Court should 
thus have reached the merits of the dispute. 
 
A. The Oral Decision Was Not a Final Action of 
 the ZBA. 
 
The ripeness of T Mobile’s initial complaint depends 
upon whether the ZBA’s oral decision was a “final action” 
within the meaning of the TCA.  Consideration of that issue 
uncovers another: whether the TCA requires a locality to 
render its decision in writing for that decision to qualify as a 
final action.  The District Court held that, under both federal 
and Delaware law, only a written decision can serve as a final 
action of the ZBA.  Because traditional hallmarks of agency 
action and the statutory text and structure of the TCA favor 
that approach, we agree that only a written decision can serve 
as a locality’s final action when denying an application. 
 
In Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, 
(Riverkeeper III), we determined that, when reviewing 
finality under the Natural Gas Act, “[a]lthough the 
decisionmaking process we are reviewing is defined by [state] 
law, we nevertheless apply a federal finality standard to 
determine whether Congress has made the results of that 
process reviewable[.]”  903 F.3d 65, 72 (3d Cir. 2018).  The 
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same reasoning holds true here, since, for the TCA just as for 
the Natural Gas Act, “the finality requirement itself, along 
with the presumption that Congress intended us to apply it, 
are creatures of federal, not state, law.”  Id. at 71. 
 
Under federal law, not all agency determinations are 
final actions.  Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519 (3d Cir. 
1992).  Final agency actions bear certain “traditional 
hallmarks” that demonstrate “[t]here is nothing left for the 
agency to do[,]”  Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y of Pa. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., (Riverkeeper II), 870 F.3d 171, 178 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  We noted those hallmarks on an earlier occasion 
when we said that, “[f]inal agency action must mark the 
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process, must 
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature, and must 
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, 
or from which legal consequences will flow.”  Riverkeeper 
III, 903 F.3d at 72, 75 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
To decide what the TCA requires for finality, we 
begin, of course, with the text.  See, e.g., Ross v. Blake, 136 S. 
Ct. 1850, 1856 (2016) (“Statutory interpretation … begins 
with the text[.]”)  Here, the statutory text makes it clear that, 
if a denial is not in writing, there is something left for the 
agency to do.  The denial provision of the TCA states that 
“[a]ny decision … to deny … shall be in writing and 
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record.”  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).  We see no reason 
why the same should not be true for actions besides denial,6 
                                                 
6  For instance, it is not apparent why community 
members aggrieved by a decision to grant some permit to a 
13 
 
but we need not decide that today.  It is enough to say that, in 
those zoning decisions governed by the TCA, a locality’s oral 
declaration of a denial is “of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature.”  Riverkeeper III, 903 F.3d at 72 
(citation omitted) (speaking in reference to the Natural Gas 
Act); cf. Athens Cellular, Inc. v. Oconee Cty., 886 F.3d 1094, 
1104-05, 1107 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that a zoning board 
could have approved the minutes, revised them, or rejected 
them, and thus until the board approved the minutes its 
decision was not final).   
 
Moreover, an oral decision is not an action from which 
legal consequences flow.  Federal law governs finality, but 
Delaware’s procedures still matter, and the Delaware 
Superior Court has concluded that a written document must 
be filed for a ZBA action to be final.  McDonald’s Corp. v. 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for the City of Wilmington, No. 
CIV. A. 01A-05-011CG, 2002 WL 88944, at *1 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 10, 2002).  The court reasoned that Section 328 of 
Title 22 of the Delaware Code, the section that governs 
appeals from ZBA proceedings, requires a written document 
to be filed because the statute “provides that [s]uch petition 
shall be presented to the Court within 30 days after the filing 
of the decision in the office of the board.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That reasoning is persuasive and 
                                                                                                             
 
wireless provider, assuming those members have standing to 
sue, would not be equally entitled to a zoning authority’s 
written decision before the time limit in the TCA’s review 
provision is triggered. 
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shows that, under Delaware law, the ZBA’s oral decision is 
without legal consequences.7    
 
There are distinct policy advantages to forestalling 
judicial scrutiny until a written denial is issued.  Requiring a 
written decision focuses review on a particular, documented 
statement of reasons.  See USCOC of Greater Mo. v. City of 
Ferguson, 583 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Because the 
written decision is the central object of our scrutiny under the 
TCA, the process of judicial review is best served by delaying 
the ripening of a TCA claim until the local authority has 
issued its written decision.”).  It also prevents ambiguity with 
respect to when a claim can be brought.  As the District Court 
here stated, to hold otherwise “would promote a pernicious 
ambiguity as to when that short period of time begins to run.”  
(App. at 7.)  And it promotes uniformity of federal procedures 
by clarifying when, across all jurisdictions, an action becomes 
final.   
                                                 
7  T Mobile cites to a different opinion, Schmalhofer v. 
Board of Adjustment of Newark, to advance a contrary 
position.  No. C.A. 99A-05-010-WTQ, 2000 WL 703510 
(Del. Super. Ct. May 9, 2000).  Schmalhofer states in a 
footnote that “a written decision is not required or expressly 
contemplated by this section.”  Id. at *3 n.3.  But T Mobile is 
stretching the Schmalhofer court’s language too far.  In that 
case, the City of Newark had issued a verbatim transcript of 
the hearing, so there was a writing.  Id. at *3; see infra note 
11.  There is no indication of any written decision in this case, 
prior to December 22, 2016, when the City issued the written 






The Supreme Court’s decision in T-Mobile South, LLC 
v. City of Roswell, Georgia, also adds support to the 
conclusion that only a written denial can constitute final 
action, triggering a party’s right to review.  135 S. Ct. 808 
(2015).  In that case, the Court held that the “substantial 
evidence” supporting a locality’s decision to deny must be 
released contemporaneously with the written decision to 
deny.8  Id. at 811-12.  In doing so, the Court tied together a 
local zoning authority’s final action, which triggers judicial 
review, and its decision to deny, which must be in writing.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court said in no uncertain terms that, 
“[t]he relevant ‘final action’ [in that case, was] the issuance of 
the written notice of denial[.]”  Id. at 817 n.4.  The Court 
linked the locality’s decision to deny to the 30-day time limit 
to file a complaint after a final action has been taken.  Id. at 
817 (“Only once the denial is issued would the 30-day 
commencement-of-suit clock begin.”); id. at 813 (“[N]ow 29 
days after the City denied petitioner’s application—petitioner 
filed suit in Federal District Court.”).   
 
The Court went on to discuss timing, saying, “the 
locality must provide or make available its written reasons at 
essentially the same time as it communicates its denial[,]” 
“[b]ecause an entity may not be able to make a considered 
                                                 
8  The Court was interpreting the denial provision, 
which, as we noted earlier, states that, “[a]ny decision by a 
State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a 
request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless 
service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record.”  47 
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. at 811.  
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decision whether to seek judicial review without knowing the 
reasons for the denial of its application, and because a court 
cannot review the denial without knowing the locality’s 
reasons[.]”  Id. at 816.  The majority opinion was critical of 
the dissent for attempting to “fashion a world in which a 
locality can wait until a lawsuit is commenced and a court 
orders it to state its reasons[,] … [leaving the challenging 
entity to] risk being sandbagged by the written reasons that 
the locality subsequently provides in litigation after the 
challenging entity has shown its cards.”  Id. at 816 n.3.  That 
critique is premised on the written decision being the final 
action that starts the 30-day time limit for commencing suit.9   
 
The Supreme Court anticipated that localities might 
need to delay issuing a written denial if they are not ready to 
release their substantial reasons.  See id. at 817 (noting that 
                                                 
9  T Mobile asserts that Wilmington has a “pattern and 
practice of not issuing a written decision of land use denials 
unless or until the City is sued.”  (Opening Br. at 7.)  But if 
only a written denial is a final action, the shot clock requires 
the City to issue that written decision within a given time 
period.  24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 14012 (2009).  T Mobile also 
asserts that when a locality has a pattern and practice of not 
releasing written decisions, that practice delays the overall 
process, since a cellular service provider would be required to 
initiate two causes of action: one to compel a written decision 
and another to challenge that written decision.  That, 
however, is precisely what Congress envisioned by providing 
separate remedies for a failure to “act” within a reasonable 





“[i]f a locality is not in a position to provide its reasons 
promptly, the locality can delay the issuance of its denial 
within this 90– or 150–day window, and instead release it 
along with its reasons once those reasons are ready to be 
provided.”).  That further counsels against treating an oral 
determination as a final action since, if an oral determination 
is deemed a final action, localities will be unable to take 
advantage of the permissible delay afforded by the shot clock 
for publishing their reasoning. 
 
Two of our sister courts of appeals agree that only a 
written decision can constitute final action.  The Eighth 
Circuit in USCOC of Greater Missouri v. City of Ferguson 
stated that “[t]he plain language of the TCA indicates that 
‘final action’ does not occur until issuance of a written 
decision.”  583 F.3d at 1041.  The Eleventh Circuit in 
Preferred Sites LLC v. Troup County likewise held a 
complaint to be timely when it was filed within 30 days of a 
written decision, even though it was filed more than 30 days 
after an oral decision.10  296 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 
                                                 
10 T Mobile attempts to distinguish Preferred Sites by 
stating that, unlike here, the case did “not address a city that 
does not issue a written decision close in time to when it 
makes the decision to deny.”  (Opening Br. at 37.)  But that 
argument is irrelevant to whether the statutory text requires a 
writing for an agency decision to be final.  T Mobile also cites 
to Preferred Sites to argue that it should not matter if there is 
a writing requirement since the oral denial could be seen as 
akin to a court announcing a decision.  It explains that “when 
an appeal is filed after the court announces a decision, but 
before the entry of the judgment, it is treated as being filed on 
the date of entry.”  (Opening Br. at 28-29 (citing Preferred 
18 
 
2002) (concluding that, “[b]ased on the plain language of the 
statute,” that “a ‘final action’ occurs when the state or local 
authority issues its written decision.  The statute expressly 
mandates a … decision … committed to writing.  Until the 
state or local authority issues its written notification, its task 
under the statute is not complete.”).  No circuit has held 
otherwise. 
 
Persuasive authority thus indicates that any action, and 
certainly a denial, must be in writing to be final.  But, there is 
another possible interpretation of the statutory text.  The 
words “shall be in writing” could be read not as a condition of 
finality, but instead as a simple directive to state and local 
governments to place their final action in writing.  “The TCA 
provides no express answer to … when a local government’s 
permitting decision becomes a ‘final action,’ which starts the 
thirty-day clock.”  Athens Cellular, 886 F.3d at 1102-03.  The 
statute only states that denials must be in writing.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(b)(iii).  Decisions to grant are not limited in the 
same way.  Id.  And, Congress used the words “decision to 
deny” in one statutory subsection and “final action” in 
another, which could evince an intent to give those terms 
different meanings.  As the Supreme Court has “recognized 
… Congress’s use of certain language in one part of the 
statute and different language in another can indicate that 
different meanings were intended.”  Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 156 (2013) (citation and quotation 
                                                                                                             
 
Sites, 296 F.3d at 1217 n.7).)  That analogy did appear in 
Preferred Sites, but it was only contained in a footnote.  No 
other court has followed that line of reasoning, and we 
decline to follow it here. 
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marks omitted).  Thus, it could be argued, if Congress wanted 
to mandate a writing for zoning denials to constitute final 
action, it could have been more explicit, providing, for 
instance, that a “decision must be in writing to qualify as a 
final action.” 
 
But, of course, one can almost always fault legislative 
drafting, like other kinds of writing, after the fact.  That 
something might have been said even more clearly does not 
mean it is not clear enough.  So, “[r]ather than expecting (let 
alone demanding) perfection in drafting,” we can “construe[] 
statutes to have a particular meaning even as we 
acknowledge[] that Congress could have expressed itself 
more clearly.”  Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1633 
(2016). 
 
The text and structure of the statute, Delaware 
procedures, Supreme Court reasoning, our sister circuits’ 
decisions, and policy arguments all support the conclusion 
that a writing is in fact a requirement for a denial to be final.11  
In light of that conclusion, the ZBA’s oral determination on 
                                                 
11  What constitutes a “writing” has some flexibility, 
though.  See, e.g., Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of 
Southfield, 355 F.3d 601, 605-07 (6th Cir. 2004) (approving 
minutes by written resolution was a final action that bound 
the parties).  In City of Roswell, for example, the Supreme 
Court indicated that minutes of an oral meeting could be 
sufficient.  135 S. Ct. at 816.  Here, however, there is no 
evidence that the ZBA’s oral determination was noted in the 
minutes of the October 26th meeting and issued by the City as 




October 26, 2016, was not a final action ripe for judicial 
review.  Therefore, as that oral determination was not reduced 
to writing until December 22, 2016, preceding the filing of 
T Mobile’s initial complaint, that complaint’s cause of action 




B. No Separate Time Limit Exists Following an 
 Oral Determination. 
 
 As an alternative to its argument that the ZBA’s oral 
decision was a final action, T Mobile asks us to consider 
whether a “local government must issue the ‘writing’ close in 
time to the ‘decision … to deny’ to establish a ‘final action’ 
that will be subject to expedited review.”12  (Opening Br. at 
41.)  Essentially, T Mobile is asserting that the “shot clock” 
governing the time to act, which allows a wireless carrier to 
sue for a locality’s failure to act, is insufficient, and that a 
new requirement, albeit not in the statute, should be imposed 
on localities.  Under T Mobile’s proposed rule, an oral 
decision would have to be reduced to writing within a 
specified time period.  That argument assumes that an oral 
determination can serve to satisfy the requirement to “act” on 
a request within the limits of the shot clock, and that, without 
a separate judicially created time limit, there would be no 
deadline for the locality to release its written decision to deny, 
despite City of Rowell’s contemporaneous writing 
requirement.  Because we conclude that a denial must be in 
writing to be a final action, the issuance of that writing is the 
government “act” ruled by the shot clock.13   Aside from the 
                                                 
12  Wilmington argues that T Mobile has waived that 
issue, but we need not address that argument because we 
conclude that no such requirement exists.    
 
13  Again, the Supreme Court held in City of Roswell 
that a locality’s decision to deny must be accompanied by 
substantial reasons.  135 S. Ct. at 811-12.  Otherwise, if a 
locality were able to withhold its reasoning for its decision, 
those aggrieved by the locality’s actions would “be left to 
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time limits associated with the “shot clock,” there is no other 
deadline governing the issuance of a written decision 
following an oral determination.  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(b).  
Any time limit we fabricated would be inappropriate.  
 
T Mobile argues that, without a requirement for 
localities to issue a written decision within a set amount of 
time following an oral determination, wireless carriers are left 
“to wait until the FCC ‘shot clock’ expires – which could be 
90 or 150 days depending on the type of installation involved 
– and then [to] file an action alleging that the City has failed 
to act in a reasonable time[.]”  (Opening Br. at 45.)  It also 
contends that a “failure to act” lawsuit is insufficient because 
the remedy for a successful suit is simply an order telling the 
City to issue a written decision.  In T Mobile’s view, forcing 
wireless providers to sue both to compel a written decision 
once the shot clock is violated and again to contest the written 
decision serves only to “create yet further delay.”  (Opening 
Br. at 46.)   
 
                                                                                                             
 
guess at what the locality’s written reasons will be, write a 
complaint that contains those hypotheses, and risk being 
sandbagged by the written reasons that the locality 
subsequently provides in litigation after the challenging entity 
has shown its cards.”  Id. at 816 n.3.  If an applicant cannot 
file suit, however, because the locality’s “final action” has not 
yet occurred, those concerns vanish.  The ZBA’s decision 
here, when reduced to writing, was both its decision to deny 




Those concerns are overstated and, in any case, 
irrelevant.  The shot clock begins to run once a wireless 
provider files its application, so it is already ticking before 
any oral decision is made.  If the locality fails to meet that 
deadline by not issuing a written decision before the shot 
clock expires, the wireless provider can bring a claim for a 
“failure to act.”14  24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 14012 (2009).  T 
Mobile asserts that requiring a separate failure-to-act suit, in 
addition to a suit on the merits, undercuts the statutory 
purpose of expedited judicial review, particularly in cases 
where the locality has a “pattern and practice of not issuing a 
written decision of land use denials unless or until [it] is 
sued.”  (Opening Br. at 7.)  But the statute’s own remedies 
cannot possibly undercut its purpose.  A separate failure-to-
act claim is the very remedy Congress chose for shot clock 
violations.  24 FCC Rcd. 14013 at ¶ 4 (2009).  Whether or not 
T Mobile likes that policy choice, it is the one Congress 
made, and we are not free to change it.   
 
C. The Timing Requirement Is Not  
 Jurisdictional. 
 
Because we hold that a writing is required for a denial 
to constitute a final action, T Mobile’s initial complaint was 
not ripe for review when filed.  And, T Mobile’s 
supplemental complaint was filed more than 30 days after the 
ZBA issued its written decision and was therefore untimely 
under the TCA’s review provision.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  Thus, the District Court only had 
jurisdiction if T Mobile’s supplemental complaint cured the 
                                                 
14 It is not clear which time limit would have applied in 
this case and whether it would have been violated. 
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ripeness flaw in its initial complaint by relating back to the 
original filing date.  If the 30-day time limit in the TCA’s 
review provision is nonjurisdictional, we can safely say that 
relation back is possible and allows a supplemental complaint 
to cure a defective premature filing.15  At the outset, then, we 
must determine whether that 30-day time limit is 
jurisdictional, being mindful both of the Supreme Court’s 
counsel to exercise caution before holding timing 
requirements to be jurisdictional and of its guidance regarding 
what constitutes a jurisdictional limit.16  Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 
149, 153-54.  Caution is indeed warranted because statutes of 
limitations and other filing deadlines “ordinarily are not 
jurisdictional.”  Id. at 154; see also United States v. Kwai Fun 
Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (“[M]ost time bars are 
nonjurisdictional.”). 
 
                                                 
15  We do not reach the issue of whether an unripe 
complaint can be cured by a supplemental or amended 
pleading over which the Court lacked jurisdiction.  
 
16 The City claims that our decision in Nextel Partners 
Inc. v. Kingston Township, 286 F.3d 687 (3d Cir. 2002) is 
effectively determinative.  Not so.  In Kingston Township, 
then-Judge Alito noted that the District Court had held the 
timing requirement in the TCA’s review provision was 
jurisdictional.  Id. at 695.  But we did not address whether 
that determination was correct, nor did we rely on it.  Instead, 
we concluded that there could be no “failure to act” towards 
an application that was not submitted.  Id. at 692.  Since our 
decision in that case, the Supreme Court has clarified the 
process for determining if a time limit is jurisdictional.  
Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 149.   
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“[T]o ward off profligate use of the term ‘jurisdiction,’ 
[the Supreme Court has] adopted a readily administrable 
bright line for determining whether to classify a statutory 
limitation as jurisdictional.”  Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 153 (citing 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006)) 
(quotation marks omitted).  We are to ask “whether Congress 
has clearly state[d] that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a 
clear statement, we  … should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional in character.”  Id. (alteration in original) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Musacchio v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716 (2016) (Thus, “[w]e treat a 
time bar as jurisdictional only if Congress has ‘clearly stated’ 
that it is.”).  In deciding whether Congress has made such a 
clear statement, “we evaluate the ‘text, context, and relevant 
historical treatment.’”  United States v. Kalb, 891 F.3d 455, 
460 (2018) (quoting Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. 154, 166 
(2010)).   
 
Referencing that last test, Wilmington asserts that 
“[s]ection 332’s statutory grant of jurisdiction to district 
courts, the text of the statute, the placement of the filing 
window in that same section, and the well-established 
treatment of the filing window as jurisdictional, [all 
demonstrate] that the filing window is jurisdictional.”  
(Answering Br. at 15.)  We disagree.  The differences 
between the review provision’s timing requirement and the 
timing requirement we held to be jurisdictional in Kalb, and 
the similarities between the review provision’s timing 
requirements and those at issue in Sebelius and Musacchio, 
which the Supreme Court held to be nonjurisdictional, 
actually support treating the timing requirement in the TCA’s 




First, although Wilmington says that the text of the 
statute indicates Congress’s desire to make the 30-day timing 
requirement jurisdictional, the text does not use the term 
“jurisdictional” or any variation of it to describe the timing 
requirement.  47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  To the contrary, 
the statute uses permissive rather than mandatory language.  
Unlike the timing requirement we held to be jurisdictional in 
Kalb, which mandated that an action would be barred if not 
filed in time, the TCA’s review provision states that an action 
“may” be filed within 30-days.  Compare Kalb, 891 F.3d at 
460 with 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  The language is much 
closer to that which the Supreme Court decided was 
nonjurisdictional in Sebelius.  The statute at issue in that case, 
like the review provision here, uses a permissive phrase – 
“may obtain a hearing” – before it states the timing 
requirement.17  Compare Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 154, with 47 
U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (“may … commence an action”).  
Similar to the timing requirement the Supreme Court held to 
be nonjurisdictional in Musacchio, the review provision does 
not confer jurisdiction, instead it allows an action to be 
                                                 
17  T Mobile also points to Henderson v. Shinseki, 
which held a timing requirement to be nonjurisdictional even 
though it used the mandatory “shall” before stating the timing 
requirement.  562 U.S. 428, 441-42 (2011).  But the decision 
in Shinseki, where the pertinent timing requirement could 
have barred a veteran’s appeal, was partly based on “the 
canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed 
Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor,” and 
so it is of less utility in deciding this dispute.  Id. at 441 





commenced “in any court of competent jurisdiction.”  See 
Musacchio, 136 S. Ct. at 717 (“[The provision] does not 
expressly refer to subject-matter jurisdiction or speak in 
jurisdictional terms.”).  The text of the statute therefore favors 
a holding that the timing requirement is nonjurisdictional.   
 
Wilmington next contends that the context of the 
timing requirement favors the view that the requirement is 
jurisdictional, because the Supreme Court has stated that it is 
“inextricably linked to … the language that creates the right 
of action[.]”  (Answering Br. at 13-14 (citing City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 125 (2005)).)  Thus, 
says the City, the “filing window created by [the review 
provision] is jurisdictional [because] it is integral to the 
express purpose of the section, to this Court’s jurisdiction, 
and to the parties’ rights and obligations[.]”  (Answering Br. 
at 8.)  
 
True enough, the review provision’s timing 
requirement does appear in the same subsection as the 
statutory text granting jurisdiction.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).  And, as we stated in Kalb, the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210 
(2007), and Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. at 166, 
both found the source of the timing requirement to be 
important in determining whether that requirement was 
jurisdictional.  891 F.3d at 462.  In Kalb, moreover, we made 
the same point the City now does, stating that a timing 
requirement was jurisdictional because “the thirty-day appeal 
period here is embedded in the same statutory section that 




But the location of the timing requirement within the 
statutory structure, without more, does not clearly reveal 
Congressional intent.  As noted by the Supreme Court in 
Sebelius, a timing requirement should not be classified as 
jurisdictional solely based on its placement in a jurisdictional 
provision.  Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 155 (“A requirement we 
would otherwise classify as nonjurisdictional … does not 
become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in a section 
of a statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions.” 
(citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 146-47 (2012))).  In 
Musacchio too, the Supreme Court held that a timing 
requirement was nonjurisdictional despite its presence in the 
jurisdiction-granting section of the statute at issue.  136 S. Ct. 
at 717.  The Court emphasized that the statute did not directly 
speak of the timing requirement as jurisdictional, despite its 
mandatory language.  Id.  That reasoning applies with at least 
equal force here, so the context of the review provision’s 
timing requirement does not make the requirement 
jurisdictional. 
 
Finally, Wilmington asserts that the timing 
requirement is jurisdictional because of the historical 
treatment of similar provisions.  The City asserts that the 
phrase “within 30 days after” creates a “window,” during 
which a complaint must be filed, and not a “deadline.”  
(Answering Br. at 11-12 (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 
773 F.2d 375, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (noting that “within 60 
days after” creates a 60-day filing window while “no later 
than 60 days after” creates a filing deadline).)  But that 
argument misses the point because it goes to whether the rule 
bars suit between certain dates or only after a certain date, not 
to whether the timing requirement is jurisdictional.  See, e.g., 
Union Tel. Co., 773 F.2d at 377-78 (discussing whether the 
29 
 
filing window is a jurisdictional bar for suits filed before the 
window opens).  And just because a complaint may be unripe 
before a particular date does not mean that a deadline by 
which suit must be filed is jurisdictional.  As we stated in 
Kalb, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bowles and Reed 
Elsevier both looked to “the Court’s prior treatment of 
[similar timing requirements.]”  Kalb, 891 F.3d at 460.  In 
Sebelius, the timing requirement, as here, used the phrase 
“within” and thus, under Wilmington’s logic, it would have 
been a jurisdictional limit.  Sebelius, 568 U.S. at 154.  But the 
Supreme Court held otherwise, id., and that is of high 
importance.   
 
Because the text and context of this statute, and 
historical treatment of timing requirements in similar statutes, 
do not reveal a clear intent from Congress to make the review 
provision’s timing requirement jurisdictional, we conclude 
that it is not.18   
 
D. Rule 15 Allows a Supplemental Complaint 
 Filed After a Claims Processing Deadline To 
 Relate Back and Cure an Unripe Initial 
 Complaint. 
 
We next consider whether an untimely supplemental 
complaint can, by relating back, cure an initial complaint that 
was unripe.  We believe it can, and because T Mobile’s 
                                                 
18  That conclusion is further supported by the 
thoughtful concurrence in Athens Cellular, concluding after 
Sebelius that the timing requirement “imposed by Congress in 
the TCA … is not a jurisdictional bar.”  Athens Cellular, 886 
F.3d at 1113 (Kaplan, J. concurring).   
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motion to supplement its complaint was properly granted, that 
supplemental complaint relates back and is ripe.  The District 
Court therefore had jurisdiction and should not have granted 
Wilmington’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
At the outset, we note that the parties do not dispute, 
and we agree, that the District Court was within its discretion 
to grant T Mobile’s motion to supplement its complaint.  
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), “[o]n 
motion and reasonable notice, the [district] court may, on just 
terms, permit a [moving] party to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting out any … event that happened after the date 
of the pleading to be supplemented.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); 
see also 3 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 
¶ 15.30 (3d ed. 2018) (“Supplemental pleadings … are 
limited to subsequent events related to the claim or defense 
presented in the original pleading.”).  Here, the District Court 
rightly granted T Mobile’s motion to supplement.  That 
decision was just, since Wilmington had long since had notice 
of the event – the filing of the written denial – that occurred 
after the initial pleading.  After all, the City issued that denial, 
and the denial was featured in the parties’ discovery plan.  
The issuance of it was also plainly related to T Mobile’s 
initial complaint.   
 
That the initial complaint was premature is not a bar 
since, under Rule 15(d), “[t]he court may permit 
supplementation even though the original pleading is 
defective in stating a claim for relief or defense.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(d).  As the Advisory Committee Notes make clear, 
“Rule 15(d) is intended to give the [district] court broad 
discretion in allowing a supplemental pleading.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(d) advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment.  It is 
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furthermore “within the discretion of the court to allow a 
supplemental pleading to be filed at any stage of the case[.]”  
Moore et al., supra, ¶ 15.30.  The District Court here was thus 
well within its discretion in granting T Mobile’s motion to 
supplement the complaint. 
 
Rule 15 does not indicate whether or under what 
circumstances a supplemental pleading can relate back to the 
date of the original pleading to avoid the effect of a time 
limit.  6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1508 (3d ed. 2018).  Subsection (c) of the Rule, 
which provides for the relation back of amended pleadings, 
does not specifically refer to supplemental pleadings.  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(c).  Nor does Rule 15(d) make any mention of 
relation back.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).  But case law and 
secondary sources have long instructed that once a 
supplemental complaint is granted, it is treated like an 
amended complaint for purposes of relation back.19  Thus, 
even though Rule 15(d) is in a separate statutory provision 
from Rule 15(c), a supplemental complaint can relate back.  
Wright et al., supra, § 1508; see also F.D.I.C. v. Knostman, 
966 F.2d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The distinction 
between an amended pleading and a supplemental pleading is 
                                                 
19  Courts have generally held that a supplemental 
complaint is eligible for relation back, but rely on different 
rationales to do so.  See Wright et al., supra, § 1508 (“[S]ome 
courts have held that for purposes of applying the relation-
back doctrine a supplemental pleading may be treated as an 
amended pleading under Rule 15(c); other courts have 
applied the relation-back principle directly to supplemental 
pleadings even though Rule 15(d) does not mention it.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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often disregarded for purposes of relation back under Rule 
15(c).”); Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 303 F.2d 674, 
680-81 (8th Cir. 1962) (finding supplemental pleading related 
back despite plaintiff suing in the wrong capacity and not 
achieving appropriate status for diversity jurisdiction until 
after the limitations period had expired).  That stands to 
reason, since, if a “defendant had notice of the subject matter 
of the dispute and was not prejudiced in preparing a defense 
…[,] the policy against stale claims becomes subsidiary to the 
policy expressed throughout the rules in favor of allowing a 
party to set forth all the grievances against another party in 
one action and resolving them on their merits.”  Wright et al., 
supra, § 1508.   
 
So a pleading filed according to Rule 15(d) can relate 
back, assuming it meets “the basic test for relation back 
prescribed by Rule 15(c).”  Id.; see also Moore et al., supra, 
¶ 15.30 (“A supplemental pleading may relate back to the 
date of the original complaint if the requirements under Rule 
15(c) for relation back are satisfied”); Davis v. Piper Aircraft 
Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 609 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980) (supplemental 
pleading relates back if Rule 15(c)’s test is met).  In fact, as 
the District Court observed, if a supplemental complaint 
meets the requirements for relation back then “[r]elation back 
is mandatory,” and not subject to additional equitable 
considerations.20  (App. at 6 (citing Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 
434 F.3d 196, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2006)).)  
                                                 
20  We note, however, that “[a] party opposing the 
introduction of a supplemental pleading might wish to raise 
the statute-of-limitations defense when the additional 
pleading (1) alleges new matter that brings the earlier 




Looking then to Rule 15(c), a complaint “relates back 
to the date of the original pleading when … [it] asserts a 
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set out -- or attempted to be set out -- in the 
original pleading[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).  The 
District Court here concluded that there was no need to 
determine whether T Mobile’s supplemental complaint 
related back, because, even if it did, “it fail[ed] to cure the 
deficiencies of the initial complaint[.]”  (App. at 8.)  But 
given our view that the supplemental complaint could indeed 
cure the ripeness problem with the initial complaint, we must 
contend with the relation-back question. 
 
To determine if relation back is proper, the only issue 
is whether there is a “common core of operative facts in the 
two pleadings.”  Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 387 F.3d 298, 
310 (3d Cir. 2004.)  Here, that test is met.  Both complaints 
rely on the same core facts.  The written denial was a 
certification and restatement of the earlier oral denial.   
 
Thus, the only question remaining is whether a 
complaint that relates back can cure an untimely initial 
complaint, and the answer is yes.  The clear preference 
embodied in Rule 15 is for merits-based decision making.  Cf. 
Moore et al., supra, ¶ 15.30 (“The same principles that 
support the liberal amendment of pleadings also apply to 
supplemental pleadings.”).  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
the purpose of Rule 15 is “to balance the interests of the 
                                                                                                             
 
or (3) states a new claim that arose after the filing of the 




defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the 
preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on 
their merits.”  Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 
550 (2010).  The requirements of Rule 15 itself protect 
defendants from an unfair relation back.21  Under that Rule, 
courts “look[s] to whether the opposing party has had fair 
notice of the general fact situation and legal theory upon 
which the amending party proceeds.”  Bensel, 387 F.3d at 
310.  In this instance, Wilmington had sufficient notice since 
the supplemented complaint simply alleged the issuance of 
the ZBA’s written denial.  And, of course, Wilmington had 
notice of everything in the supplemental complaint.  It not 
only knew of the written denial and the reasons given, it 
generated them.   
 
Relation back has been allowed to address 
jurisdictional problems.  We said in Berkshire Fashions, Inc. 
v. M.V. Hakusan II that relation back may be used to cure 
defects in jurisdictional allegations.  954 F.2d 874, 878 (3rd 
Cir. 1992).  In that case, the District Court had dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim based on admiralty jurisdiction and denied 
the plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint to allege 
diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 877.  We concluded that both 
decisions were in error, holding that an amended complaint 
relates back and can cure insufficient pleading of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 878.  Recently, our Circuit allowed 
                                                 
21  This is not a pass for endless delay in 
supplementing a complaint.  Indeed, we have endeavored to 
emphasize that whether to allow supplemental pleading 
depends on equitable considerations of fairness and notice 
that district courts must take into account. 
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a plaintiff to cure a diversity defect when the case had been 
litigated for years.  See GBForefront, L.P., v. Forefront 
Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 888 F.3d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“instruct[ing] the [d]istrict [c]ourt to give leave to further 
amend the complaint … to cure defective jurisdictional 
allegations”). 
 
Other circuits have held the same.  See Woods v. Ind. 
Univ.-Purdue Univ. at Indianapolis, 996 F.2d 880, 884 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“Consistent with its history and purpose, Rule 
15(c) has uniformly been applied to relate back [filings] that 
cure defective statements of jurisdiction ….”); Boyce v. 
Anderson, 405 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1968) (allowing 
amendment alleging that no previous appeal had been taken 
to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to 
cure jurisdictional defect in complaint after statute of 
limitations had expired).  That conclusion is also consistent 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1653, which allows “[d]efective allegations 
of jurisdiction [to] be amended, upon terms, in the trial or 
appellate courts.”  Id.   
 
Courts have similarly permitted cure of actual defects 
in the court’s jurisdiction, going beyond just jurisdictional 
allegations.  For instance, although not in a case involving a 
later complaint, the Supreme Court has said that a court can 
drop a dispensable non-diverse party to cure a defect in 
diversity jurisdiction.  Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837-38 (1989); see also E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd’s & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 
2001) (stating that, “where it is appropriate to relate back an 
amendment to a pleading under Rule 15, jurisdiction is 
assessed as if the amendment had taken place at the time the 
complaint was first filed[,]” and thus replacing a non-diverse 
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plaintiff with a diverse plaintiff cured any jurisdiction 
problem); Rowe v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 421 F.2d 
937, 939, 944 (4th Cir. 1970) (concluding that a defective 
complaint could be cured by a later complaint that pled an 
assignment occurring after the original complaint was filed).   
 
Nonetheless, “[a]mendments that go beyond the mere 
correction or factual modification of the original pleading and 
significantly alter the claim or defense alleged in that 
pleading are treated more cautiously by the courts in applying 
the relation-back doctrine.”  Wright et al., supra, § 1497.  The 
Second Circuit, for instance, only sometimes allows 
jurisdictional defects to be cured “when the underlying facts, 
if properly pled, would have supported jurisdiction at the time 
the action commenced.”  Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. First 
Equities Corp. of Fla., 338 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2003); see 
also, e.g., Barton v. Ellis, No. 75-1188, 1977 WL 15469, at 
*1 (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 1977) (denying using relation back to 
cure the original complaint since they were defects “not [in 
the] allegations of existing underlying jurisdictional facts but 
rather [in] the prerequisite jurisdictional facts themselves”).  
Wilmington argues such hesitance is appropriate here because 
allowing relation back to cure the jurisdictional problem with 
T Mobile’s initial complaint “would allow two wrongs under 
Section 332 [(filing early and filing late)] to make a right.”  
(Answering Br. at 2.)   
 
We again disagree with the City.  It is quite true that 
T Mobile has made procedural matters more difficult than 
they should be in this case.  But denying relation-back to cure 
the defect in this instance would not comport with Rule 15’s 
aim to encourage resolution of disputes on the merits 
whenever possible.  The ripeness requirement exists so that 
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courts avoid issuing essentially advisory opinions.  See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 224 (5th ed. 2003) (noting that 
the ripeness doctrine allows courts to avoid a “dispute … too 
‘ill-defined’ to be appropriate for judicial resolution until 
further developments … more sharply framed the issues for 
decision.”).  That concern ceased to exist here once the 
supplemental pleading was in place.  At that point, the dispute 
had matured and become capable of judicial review, 
demonstrating that, “actions taken after the filing of the initial 
complaint can be used to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction.”  Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 
F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 
If a supplemental complaint cannot cure an unripe 
complaint, an endless feedback loop would be created 
whereby the ripeness problem could never be overcome, even 
though, as here, the dispute later became obviously ripe.  Our 
sister circuits have recognized that problem and concluded 
that a supplemental complaint is the solution.22  In Wilson v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Eighth Circuit determined 
that prohibiting an amended (or supplemental) complaint 
from alleging facts that occurred after the date the initial 
                                                 
22 In our Circuit, a thoughtful district court decision 
had long ago reached that conclusion.  It held that an 
untimely supplement adding facts occurring after the initial 
filing that showed exhaustion of administrative remedies 
could relate back to the initial premature complaint and allow 
maintenance of the lawsuit.  Bates v. W. Elec., 420 F. Supp. 





complaint was filed would turn a premature complaint into an 
“irretrievable mistake that bars jurisdiction” and would be 
“precisely the kind of procedural mousetrap that the Federal 
Rules were designed to dismantle.”  838 F.2d 286, 289 (8th 
Cir. 1988).  The court held that, “[e]ven when the District 
Court lacks jurisdiction over a claim at the time of its original 
filing, a supplemental complaint may cure the defect by 
alleging the subsequent fact which eliminates the 
jurisdictional bar.”  Id. at 290 (citing Mathews, 426 U.S. at 
75).  While Wilson addressed a circumstance in which the 
supplemental complaint was timely filed, the proposition still 
applies in a case like ours because, if a party was limited to 
refiling within an applicable time limit, there would be little 
need to make provision for supplementation of a complaint, 
as a new complaint could be filed.23   
                                                 
23  We note that sparing the cost of refiling and 
providing convenience to the Court would remain legitimate 
reasons for allowing supplemental complaints.  But the 
purpose of Rule 15(d) is broader.  See Wright et al., supra, § 
1504 (“The purpose of subdivision (d) is to promote as 
complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as 
is possible. …  A supplemental pleading may be employed 
for a variety of purposes.”).  Wilmington contends that 
Wilson is inapposite since it involved a timely supplemental 
complaint.  Thus, concern about a perpetual loop outcome 
was not proper because the plaintiff could have simply refiled 
his complaint.  But we agree that “a plaintiff need not 
commence a new action when after-occurring events 
demonstrate that it has a right to relief even if the original 
complaint was insufficient.  A plaintiff may also be allowed 
to supplement the complaint even if jurisdiction … would not 




The Ninth Circuit, in Security Insurance Co. of New 
Haven v. United States ex rel. Haydis, also relied on that logic 
to find that relation back could cure an unripe complaint filed 
before a statutory filing window opened.  338 F.2d 444, 448-
49 (9th Cir. 1964).  In a fact scenario with striking similarities 
to the present appeal, the plaintiff had filed its claim before a 
statutory waiting period was over and then did not file an 
amended complaint until after the statute of limitations period 
had run.  Id. at 445-46.  The appeals court held that the 
district court was “not required to apply the doctrine of 
relation back so literally as to carry it to a time [before it was 
ripe] so as to prevent the maintenance of the action in the first 
place.”  Id. at 449.   
 
The Supreme Court has favorably cited Security 
Insurance’s ruling.  In Mathews, the plaintiff had not satisfied 
a precondition of filing a complaint by first filing an 
application with a particular agency.  426 U.S. at 72, 75.  The 
Court noted that a supplemental complaint, alleging that the 
application had since been filed, would have cured the 
jurisdictional defect.  Id. at 75.  In saying so, the Court relied 
                                                                                                             
 
independent action.”  Moore et al., supra, ¶ 15.30 (3d ed. 
2018) (citation omitted).  If supplemental complaints could 
not cure ripeness, “then all supplemental pleadings of this 
nature would be defeated for lack of jurisdiction – [the] 
‘procedural mousetrap’ would render all supplemental 
pleadings void.”  George v. IRS, No. C05-00955 MJJ, 2006 
WL 3499230, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2006) (citation 




on Security Insurance.  Id. at 75 n.8 (citing Security 
Insurance, 338 F.2d at 447-49).24   
 
 Yet Wilmington asserts that ripeness can never be 
cured by a later complaint.  It advances four cases for that 
proposition, but none are helpful.  First, the City cites 
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection, (Riverkeeper I), 
833 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2016), in which we concluded that, 
“even though the underlying claim became ripe for review 
during the pendency of the case, the ripening of the claim did 
not cure deficient pleadings.”  (App. at 8.)  In that case, 
however, no attempt to file a later complaint alleging ripeness 
was made.  Riverkeeper I, 833 F.3d at 369-70. 
 
Likewise, in another two of the four cases that 
Wilmington cites, there was no effort made to amend or 
supplement the complaint.  See TeleSTAR, Inc. v. FCC, 888 
F.2d 132, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding non-final agency 
action at the time of filing of petition may only be reviewed 
upon the filing of another petition); W. Union Tel. Co., 773 
F.2d at 377-78 (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction 
over challenges filed before the action became final).  
Therefore, neither case determined whether relation back of a 
later-filed complaint could cure a ripeness problem in the 
initial complaint. 
                                                 
24  Wilmington contends that Mathews is inapposite 
since the statute of limitations was waived.  That argument 
has no traction since, if it were a jurisdictional bar, it could 






The City fares no better relying on Council Tree 
Communications v. FCC, in which we stated that “[a] petition 
to review a non-final agency order is incurably premature.”  
503 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2007).  At no point in that case 
was the complaint ripe, and the petitioner still had a petition 
for reconsideration pending before the relevant agency on the 
date the case was decided.  Id. at 287.  Furthermore, Council 
Tree explicitly acknowledged that a supplemental complaint 
can cure an unripe complaint when there is jurisdiction over 
that supplemental pleading.  See id. at 291 (“[W]e note that 
‘nothing prevented [the petitioners] from supplementing their 
premature petition with a later protective petition.’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. 
E.P.A., 130 F.3d 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).   
 
Wilmington also makes three policy arguments in 
support of its position that an untimely supplemental 
complaint should not be able to cure an unripe complaint.  
First, it contends that allowing suits to be filed before an 
action is ripe would “extend[] federal court jurisdiction over 
local government actions before those actions are final[.]”  
(Answering Br. at 9.)   Second, such filings would waste 
judicial resources and, in this case, cost taxpayers money, by 
forcing courts to deal with a higher volume of unripe 
complaints.  Third, the purpose of § 332 is to preserve local 
zoning authority, which would be undermined by allowing 
plaintiffs to file suit early and thereby places undue pressure 
on zoning commissions.   
 
Those contentions, however, are unpersuasive.  First, a 
court would remain without jurisdiction if the claim had not 
ripened by the time of the supplemental complaint.  Second, it 
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seems that Wilmington overstates the impact that a decision 
allowing an unripe complaint to be cured would have, since 
our holding today makes it clear that an action is not final 
until a written decision has been issued.  Clarifying when a 
determination is ripe for review should end any incentive for 
aggrieved parties to file early to ensure they have not filed too 
late. 
 
Perhaps more importantly, however, courts can police 
any potential abuse on a case-by-case basis using Rule 15(d) 
and the Rule 15(c) test for relation back.  It is understood that 
“relation back of a supplemental pleading should not result in 
providing unfair procedural advantages to a plaintiff[,] so … 
relation back may not be for all purposes.”  Wright et al., 
supra, § 1508.  But here no unfair advantage has resulted, and 
defendants in general will be adequately protected by a 
district court’s Rule 15(d) analysis, which will determine if a 
supplemental complaint should be allowed at all.  For 
instance, if a locality’s action is not yet a final action at the 
time a Rule 15(d) motion is filed, the motion can easily be 
denied.  See Beezley v. Fremont Indem. Co., 804 F.2d 530, 
530 (9th Cir. 1986) (supplemental pleading denied when it 
still failed to cure defective original pleading).   
 
When all is said and done here, we conclude that, to 
effectuate the liberal purpose of Rule 15 and to avoid the 
endless feedback loop that the City’s legal argument would 
create, Rule 15 allows an untimely supplemental complaint to 






 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment, 
vacate the District Court’s denial of T Mobile’s motion for 
summary judgment, and remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.25   
 
                                                 
25  We will vacate the District Court’s denial of 
T Mobile’s motion for summary judgment because it was 
solely based on a finding that T Mobile’s suit was not timely 
brought. 
